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[U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo, commenting on the per-
versity of the exclusionary rule, contemptuously remarked—“The criminal 
is to go free because the constable has blundered.” Cardozo understood 
that “fidelity to law” meant having law practically apply to real life situa-
tions. In this article the author argues that in a post-9/11 world one can no 
longer consider legitimate law judicial activist decisions that separates 
law from morality—judicial ideas read into the US Constitution without 
any reliance to the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution, thus 
making a mockery of the rule of law (Miranda v. Arizona, et al.,). This is 
the centennial year since the first case that heralded the practice of judi-
cial activism in constitutional law in modern times [Lochner v. New York 
(1905)]—a decision where the Courts in subsequent decades consciously, 
arrogantly, and systematically dispensed with finding judicial precedent 
(e.g., stare decisis) to base their opinion upon, and replaced the rule of 
law with their own personal policy preferences.] 
 
 
 
The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. 
         
          - Justice Benjamin Cardozo1
 
To consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional  
questions, would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. 
 
- Thomas Jefferson2 
 
1  Among the early critics of the exclusionary rule were Judge Cardozo, People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 
21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (the criminal will go free because the constable has blundered); and DEAN 
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 2183-84 (3d ed. 1940). For 
extensive discussion of criticism and support, with citation to the literature, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE- A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT Sec. 1.2 (2d ed. 1987). In contrast to 
Justice Cardozo’s prophetic remarks on the foolishness of the exclusionary rule, and its detrimental 
effects on the rule of law, Justice Clark, writing for the majority in 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, held that:  
 
There are those who say, as did Justice Cardozo, that under our constitutional exclusionary 
doctrine “the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.” . . . In some cases 
this will undoubtedly be the result. But, . . . there is another consideration – the imperative of 
judicial integrity. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Noth-
ing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, 
its disregard of the charter of its own existence. 
  
Here, Justice Clark begs the question by his phrase “failure to observe its own laws”. What legitimate 
law is he speaking of?—The judge-made exclusionary rule beginning with Weeks v. U.S.? A rule or 
legal doctrine that was unknown to the constitutional Framers. A law with no legitimate constitutional 
origins. It is ironic and paradoxical for a Justice to both criticize the Court for not upholding the “law” by 
failing to give legal credence to the exclusionary rule–a blatant distortion of the Constitution and an 
affront to the original Framers of the Constitution. 
2 Thomas Jefferson, America’s third president, stated in regards to the first example of judicial activism 
in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). As quoted in ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN 
MARSHALL: CONFLICT AND CONSTRUCTION 1800-1815, vol. III , 101, 144, n. 3 (1980). Jefferson to 
Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820, Works: Ford, XII, 162. Yet, at the time when he was founding the Republican 
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-  
I PROLOGUE AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The judge-made doctrine called, the “exclusionary rule”, prohibits the introduction 
at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amend-
ment right against unreasonable searches and seizures,3 the Fifth Amendment right 
to due process and the right against self incrimination, or the Sixth Amendment 
right to an attorney.4  As we shall see in this Article, the exclusionary rule is a 
perfect example of the type of pseudo-constitutional doctrine that can evolve from a 
judicial activist Supreme Court with a radical political agenda.  A radical political 
agenda that activist judges can impose into the marketplace of ideas not via the 
democratic process or by “We the People”, but by judges that cavalierly substitute 
constitutional jurisprudence with their own personal policy preferences. Proponents 
of the exclusionary rule claim that its rationale is to deter the government (primarily 
the police) from using illegally obtained evidence in securing an arrest which is in 
 
Party, Jefferson had written to a friend that “the laws of the land, administered by upright judges, would 
protect you from any exercise of power unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States.” (Jeffer-
son to Rowan, Sept. 26, 1798, id. VIII, 448.) 
3  State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz 227, 686 P2d 750, cert. den. 469 U.S. 1066, 83 L ed 2d 436, 105 S Ct 548, 
post-conviction proceeding, motion for new trial granted, remanded 152 Ariz 116, 730 2d 825, appeal 
after remand, remanded 176 Ariz 69, 859 2d 179, 147 Ariz Adv Rep 14; State v. Anderson, 286 Ark 58, 
688 SW2d 947 (overruled on other grounds by Jackson v. State, 291 Ark 98, 722 SW2d 831); People v. 
Hamilton 666 P2d 152; State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P2d 1288.  
The law encyclopaedia, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2d, has the following procedural guidelines regard-
ing search and seizure problems:  
 (1) Was there a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment? 
 –If yes, proceed to (2). 
 –If no, the evidence cannot be suppressed. 
 (2)  Was a warrant required? 
 –If yes, proceed to (2). 
 –If no, proceed to (5). 
 (3) Was a warrant obtained? 
 –If  yes, proceed to (4). 
 –If no, the evidence should be suppressed. 
 (4)  Was the warrant valid? 
 –If yes, proceed to (6). 
 –If no, proceed to (5) 
 (5)  Was there good-faith reliance on the warrant? 
 –If yes, proceed to (6). 
 –If no, the evidence should be suppressed. 
 (6)  Was the search properly conducted? 
 –If yes, the evidence should not be suppressed. 
 –If no, the evidence should be suppressed. 
See 29 Am Jur 2d § 602. 
4 Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); 
Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule In Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a 
Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L. J. 681 (1974); James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical 
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); VAN DUZEND, 
SUTTON AND CARTER, THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS, PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 
(1985); Myron Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcot-
ics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016 (1987). 
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violation of a person's constitutional rights.5 Interestingly, this reasoning was not 
offered in the opinion of the Court when they first invented this rule.6   
 
Many liberal judges, jurists, and academic lawyers believe that the origins of the 
exclusionary rule to be both legitimately constitutional and necessary to prohibit the 
government from using illegally seized evidence against a suspect.  The deductive 
reasoning is this: If the government is prohibited from using the evidence obtained 
in violation of a person's protected constitutional rights, the offending authority will 
be less prone to seek convictions in opposition of those rights.  I plan to show in 
this Article that the logic behind the exclusionary rule is both irrational and uncon-
stitutional because it largely ignores the moral assumptions that underlie the origi-
nal intent of the Constitution as delineated in the numerous writings of the 
Founding Fathers and the constitutional Framers—a synthesis of legality and moral-
ity which is the foundation of America’s legal system—Natural law. 
 
II A SHORT HISTORY OF NATURAL LAW 
What is natural law? Natural law theory holds to the idea that some laws are so 
basic and fundamental to human nature that they are discoverable by human reason 
without reference to specific laws or judicial decisions. On the other hand, positive 
law is law that is posited, man made, contingent to history, and subject to continu-
ous change. The origins of natural law, dates back to the ancient Greeks, and had its 
most salient manifestation in Stoicism.7 The Greeks understood that the basic moral 
precepts which are at the foundations of any legal system of a civilized society were 
reducible to the principles of natural law. In Roman legal theory this idea was 
further developed and codified as a common code that in essence became the com-
mon law or rule of law that controlled the conduct of all nations. Natural law ex-
isted concurrently with the various codes of specific places and times which were 
called natural rights. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and other early Christian 
philosophers furthered this idea, believing that natural law was universal to all 
peoples—Christians and non-Christian alike–while holding to the idea that revealed 
5 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (exclusionary rule applied in a search, but federal habeas corpus 
challenges were limited); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 4 L Ed 2d 1669, 80 S Ct 1437; State v. 
Clark (La App 3d Cir) 467 So 2d 602. 
6  See McKay, Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule and the Right of Privacy, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 327 
(1973). Deterring overzealous police conduct was not the original intent of the exclusionary rule as cited 
in the Weeks v. U.S. case, as today are extremely rare.  See Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreason-
able Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L. REV. 621 (1955). 
7 Theologian, Charles Ryrie, had the following prescient remarks about the ancient Greek school of 
philosophy called Stoicism— 
The Stoics, who regarded Zeno (340-265 B.C.) as their founder and whose name came from Stoa Poikile 
(Painted Porch) where he taught in Athens, emphasized the rational over the emotional.  They were 
pantheistic. Their ethics were characterized by moral earnestness and a high sense of duty, advocating 
conduct Aaccording to nature. 
HOLY BIBLE, 1572 (Ryrie ed., 1978). As quoted in WASHINGTON, THE INSEPARABILITY OF LAW AND 
MORALITY, supra note *, at 431, n. 42. 
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law, or moral standards directly derived from the Bible, gave to Christians further 
guidance for their behavior.  
 
In the middle ages, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) formulated a natural law theory as 
the primary basis for the development of the theory of international law. Philoso-
phers, Spinoza (1632-1677) and Leibniz (1646-1716), in the seventeenth century  
interpreted natural law as the foundation of ethics and morality; Jean Jacques Rous-
seau (1712-1778), in the eighteenth century, using the ideas of the Enlightenment 
Age, which reached its apotheosis during the French Revolution, formulated a 
natural law theory based on democratic and egalitarian principles. During the nine-
teenth century, the influence of natural law philosophy in American jurisprudence 
declined to a great degree as other secular-based philosophies became embraced by 
judges, lawyers, the academy and popular culture, e.g., Positivism, Empiricism, and 
Materialism.  
 
In modern times, philosophers Jacques Maritain and O. F. von Gierke understood 
natural law as a necessary intellectual counter weight to totalitarian philosophies 
and regimes like Lenin, Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler, Mao Tse Tung, Pol Pot, that 
swept across the world in ignominious war throughout the twentieth century.8   
 
III NATURAL RIGHTS 
Related to natural law was the idea of natural rights, which is a political theory that 
holds to the idea that men enter into society with certain basic rights so fundamental 
to human nature that no government can deny these rights. Natural rights theory 
was developed under Roman law, based on the idea of jus gentium [Latin. law of 
nations], the legal code that governed the relations of foreign residents of Rome. 
Natural rights in time developed into a general theory of natural law. During the 
Middle Ages, natural rights largely fell into disuse, however, beginning in the 
seventeenth century, natural rights theory reclaimed standing when it became an 
important aspect in the political philosophy and constitutional argument of the 
period, which received its most sublime expression in the writings of John Locke 
(1632-1704). Locke believed that men were by nature intrinsically rational and 
good, and that they brought with them into political society the same fundamental 
rights which they had use of at the beginning stages of society, paramount among 
them being the freedom to worship God according to the dictates of one’s own 
conscience, the right to redress their grievances to their own government, and a 
regime of rights. 
 
8  JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW (1949, 1963); O. F. VON GIERKE, 
NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY, 1500 TO 1800 (1957). See generally, DAVID BARTON, 
ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION & RELIGION (1997); PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN 
ON TRIAL (1993); DAVID M. ADAMS, PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW (1992); THE ANTI-
FEDERALISTS: SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (Joseph Sobran, ed. 1999); ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
JAMES MADISON, JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (1998). 
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Rousseau tried to resolve the paradox of natural rights of the individual with the 
need for societal stability and collaboration through the idea of he referred to as the 
“social contract.” A significant expansion of the idea of natural rights came in 
America’s original Thirteen Colonies, however, where the writings of Thomas 
Jefferson, Samuel Adams, and Thomas Paine made natural rights theory a potent 
justification for revolution. The classic expressions of natural rights are the English 
Bill of Rights (1689), the American Declaration of Independence (1776),9 the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789), and the first 10 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States (Bill of Rights, 1791). Since 
the 20th century and the rise of totalitarian regimes which repudiated all ideas of the 
intrinsic dignity and value of individual rights and humanity, there has been a 
reassertion of natural rights theory, especially in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights of the United Nations (1948).10
 
IV HISTORY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN AMERICAN LAW 
The history of the exclusionary rule dates back to the second decade of the twentieth 
century, however, the case that the rule essentially overruled dates back to 1886.  In 
Boyd v. United States, the Court, considered the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as 
running "almost into each other," holding that:  
 
Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of  
aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own tes-
timony or of  his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of 
crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation . . . [of those 
Amendments].11  
 
9 Jefferson’s sublime words in the Declaration were: “. . . Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” 
Note the significance of these ideas and ideals to Jefferson by their capitalization. DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE (1776). (*N.B.: These ideas were to be pursued by the individual, not to be an unde-
served gift of government largess). 
10 THE ILLUSTRATED COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, Vol. 14, 4317-18 (1969). See also CARL BECKER, THE 
HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS (1932); A.L. HARDING, NATURAL LAW 
AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1955); LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHTS AND HISTORY (1956).   
11  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (Court found no Fourth Amendment violation of the 
police search and seizure of books and papers, but only requires defendant to produce them . . . if not, the 
produced allegations . . . are taken as confessed). The Court in Boyd further stated:  
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two Amendments. They throw 
great light on each other. For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the 
Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evi-
dence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and 
compelling a man in a criminal case to be a witness against himself, which is condemned in 
the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and 
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive 
that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is sub-
stantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. We think it is within 
the clear intent and meaning of those terms. Id. at 633.  
It was this utilization of the Fifth Amendment that clearly required exclusionary rule, rather than one 
implied from the Fourth Amendment, on which Justice Black relied and absent a Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination violation he did not apply such a rule. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (concur-
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Since the Boyd case was narrowly tailored to its facts and an exclusionary rule 
based on Fourth Amendment violations was rejected here and by the Court a few 
years later, with the Justices following the common law rule that evidence was 
admissible however acquired.12 This common-sense, apolitical approach to inter-
preting the Constitution followed judicial precedent and the original understanding 
of America's earliest jurists like John Jay and John Marshall and sanctioned other 
Court decisions dating as far back as the earliest years of case law and jurispru-
dence in American legal history.  The Boyd decision notwithstanding, it would soon 
face a newly emerging liberal activist majority on the Supreme Court that held to a 
radically different interpretation of the Constitution, the separation of powers doc-
trine and prior judicial precedents (stare decisis).  
 
In 1914, even the plurality opinion had to accede that, "for the first time," the Court 
in Weeks  v. United States and later in Silverthorne Lumber Company v. U.S. (1920) 
held that, "in a federal prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evi-
dence secured through an illegal search and seizure."13  The Court in Weeks con-
cluded: 
 
[T]hat the letters in question were taken from the house of the accused by 
an official of the United States acting under color of his office in direct 
violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant; that having made a 
seasonable application for their return, which was heard and passed upon 
by the court, there was involved in the order refusing the application a de-
nial of the constitutional rights of the accused, and that the court should 
have restored these letters to the accused. In holding them and permitting 
their use upon the trial, we think prejudicial error was committed. . .14
 
This was a radical opinion because the Court, without any controlling precedent, or 
legitimate case law to base its opinion on, cavalierly overruled over 135 years of 
Supreme Court case law and over 280 years of America's historical respect to the 
 
ring opinion); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 493, 496-500 (1971) (dissenting opinion). The 
theory of a ''convergence'' of the two Amendments has now been disavowed by the Court. Ibid  at 1225-
26.  
12 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904) (Fourth Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in 
person and property against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers acting  under color 
of legislative or judicial sanction). Since the case arose from a state court and concerned a search by state 
officers, it could have been decided simply by holding that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable. See 
National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 71 (1914) as quoted in, Enforcing the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Exclusionary Rule, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment, n. 169. 
13 See JAMES B. HADDAD, JAMES B. ZAGEL, GARY STARKMAN, WILLIAM J. BAUER, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTS 469 (3rd ed, 1987), quoting  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914) (evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amended by a federal officer was excluded from 
evidence) [hereinafter HADDAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]. See also Silverthorne Lumber Comp. v. United 
States 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (Court upheld the legality of the exclusionary rule after an overt challenge by 
the government). 
14 MARVIN ZALMAN & LARRY SIEGEL, KEY CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11 (1994 
ed.) quoting Weeks v. U.S. 232 U.S. 383 (1914) [hereinafter ZALMAN & SIEGEL, KEY CASES AND 
COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]. 
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rule of law on the subjects of search and seizure in the face of criminal activity 
which dated back before the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation to the first 
landing of Pilgrims at Jamestown, Virginia in 1607 and the Puritans at Plymouth 
Rock, Massachusetts in 1619. It was the explicit integration of legality and morality 
that gave America its first constitution–The Mayflower Compact (1620) which in 
part reads: 
 
In the name of God, Amen . . . Grace of God, . . . Defender of the Faith. 
Having undertaken for the Glory of God, and advancement of the Christian 
Faith, and the Honour of our King and Country. . .15
 
Although the Weeks Court narrowed its ruling to only apply in federal cases, in 
1949, 35 years after Weeks was handed down, the Court in Wolf v. People of State 
of Colorado, held to no such judicial restraint and again for the first time, discussed 
the effect of the Fourth Amendment upon the states through the unconstitutional, 
judge-made “incorporation doctrine,” whereby the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment was applied to the states,16 despite the fact that the original 
intent of the Framers in adding the Bill of Rights to the Constitution was dictated 
explicitly to Congress, not to the states, nor to “We the People.”  The Court said:  
"[W]e have no hesitation in saying that where a State affirmatively to sanction such 
police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."17  Here, for the first time, the Court in Wolf, offers its rationale to 
justify the exclusionary rule which proponents continue to parrot, namely to deter 
police misconduct.  Although by 1949, when the Court ruled in Wolf, the exclusion-
ary rule was already 35 years old.  The only precedent that the Wolf Court could use 
to justify its ruling was the spurious judicial legislation of the Weeks case, but as I 
mentioned earlier, Weeks was only to be applied in federal cases.  The Wolf Court 
was seemingly in a judicial quandary.  How could the Court once again square the 
circle? No problem for an activist Court with a political, and public policy agenda, 
rather than interpreting the Constitution based on the rule of law.  
 
 Since the Wolf Court was following in the judicial activist tradition of making law 
rather than interpreting the Constitution beginning with the infamous 1905 Lochner 
decision, it eventually expanded the scope of the exclusionary rule to apply to the 
15 THE MAYFLOWER COMPACT, November 11, 1620, quoted in WASHINGTON, INSEPARABILITY OF LAW 
AND MORALITY, supra note *, at 124, also cited in WASHINGTON, id, at 124. 
16  Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (the Court held that in a prosecution in a 
State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence 
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applied the 
incorporation doctrine to apply the exclusionary rule to the Fourth, Firth, Sixth and Eighth Amend-
ments). 
17  On this point I am indebted to my mentor, Che Ali Karega (a.k.a. “Machiavelli”),  for alerting me to 
the Court’s judicial restraint by flirting with, but ultimately refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to 
the states in Wolf, and of the Court overreaching in Mapp. Justice Hugo Black, concurring that that the 
Fourth Amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth, “I agree that the federal exclusionary rule is 
not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress 
might negate.” See ZALMAN & SEIGEL, supra note 14, at 35, quoting Wolf v. Colorado. (italics mine). 
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states as well through the so-called incorporation doctrine, whereby the Bill of 
Rights are applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.18   
 
Courts of earlier generations were much less cavalier and overtly political in their 
interpretation of the Constitution than the Weeks and Wolf decisions. This fact 
became acute for in 1966, seventeen years after the Wolf decision, the Court gave us 
the now infamous Miranda v. Arizona decision.19  In Miranda, the Court held that 
before a lawful arrest, the police have to read to the suspect "his rights" which is the 
following statement:  
 
You have a right to remain silent. Anything that you say, can and will be 
used against you. You have a right to an attorney. If you can’t afford an at-
torney, one will be provided for you, etc … 
 
Violations of this purely judicially-made rule by the police in not giving the 
Miranda warnings could result in that evidence being inadmissible in court against 
the defendant. So blatantly unconstitutional and judicially illegitimate was the 
Miranda decision and the related case law developed from it, that the Supreme 
Court, a generation later and with a very different membership, was compelled to 
significantly narrow its scope. 
 
In 1985, the Court in, Oregon v. Elstad, ruled that fruits derived from statements 
obtained in violation of Miranda might be admissible despite the exclusionary rule. 
The Elstad Court indicated that not all statements excluded by Miranda are “com-
pelled” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, however, Miranda created a  
rebuttable  presumption of compulsion.20  As in many noted cases in the history or 
American jurisprudence, the  Elstad  majority opinion was developed from  the 
strong dissent in Miranda and was the only constitutional voice crying out in the 
wilderness of the shamefully pseudo-constitutionalism as expressed by  the bare 
five member Miranda  majority.  The dissent in Miranda voiced its appeal to stare 
decisis (judicial precedent) to preserve the verity the Constitution and its prior 
interpretations of the Bill of Rights when it stated: 
 
18  ZALMAN & SIEGEL, supra note 14, at 12, Sec. [C], stated: “A strictly literal reading of the Constitu-
tion on this point [the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement] would make law enforcement impossi-
ble.” 
19   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The decision made clear what law enforcement authorities 
could or could not do in trying to gain evidence for conviction. The Court said that once law officers had 
a suspect in custody and attempted to interrogate him, if the suspect "At any stage indicates that he 
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning". (Paradoxically, Thur-
good Marshall, then serving as President Lyndon Johnson’s solicitor general, argued in favor of defen-
dant Miranda on behalf of the U.S. government). See Nancy Gibbs, The Supreme Court: Filing a Legal 
Giant’s Shoes, TIME MAGAZINE., July 8, 1991; THURGOOD MARSHALL, SUPREME JUSTICE: SPEECHES 
AND WRITINGS (J. Clay Smith, Jr., ed.. 2003); CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS, 
THE WORLD OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL (1993).   
20  HADDAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 13, at 70, discussing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 
(1985). 
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The Fifth Amendment, however, has never been thought to forbid all pres-
sure to incriminate one's self in the situations covered by it. . . . the Court's 
unspoken assumption that any pressure violates the privilege  is  not sup-
ported by the  precedents and it has failed to show  why the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibits that relatively mild pressure the Due Process Clause 
permits.21
 
This reasoning was reminiscent of the Court’s holding in the Boyd case.  However, 
the logic proponents of the exclusionary rule uses is plausible, but ultimately consti-
tutionally sophistic, for the paradigm drawn is this:  
 
• illegally seized evidence = coercion 
• coercion = involuntariness 
• involuntariness = unreliability 
• unreliability = inadmissibility 
• inadmissibility = unconstitutional 
 
The judicial reasoning here is neither logically consistent nor legally legitimate, 
since for over a hundred and thirty five years prior to Weeks, judicial precedent 
allowed for coerced or involuntary seized evidence as not necessarily a violation of 
the Constitution, but evidence the Court artfully called in the Boyd case an "aggra-
vation within the condemnation" of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  Other 
problems with the  exclusionary rule are these: (1) It invites criminal exploitation of 
obvious loopholes in the law (what laymen frequently refer to as a defendant get-
ting off on “a technicality”); (2) The rule severely weakens the effectiveness of the 
rule of law; (3) Undue focus  (and its attendant penalties) are placed on police 
misconduct not on the initial criminal behavior that prompted the arrest in the first 
place; (4) The exclusionary rule severely hinders prosecuting blatant criminal 
conduct; (5) It potentially endangers public safety by allowing the guilty to go free; 
(6) The maxim: Two wrongs don't make a right (i.e., police misconduct (a wrong) + 
letting the criminal go free (a wrong) = justice (a right). However, police miscon-
duct + punishment of police misconduct = a constitutional conviction of an obvi-
ously guilty suspect; (7) Police are forced to use more subtle means to avoid the 
exclusionary rule to secure convictions of guilty criminals; (8) The original intent of 
the Constitution makes no provisions for any exclusionary rule and would have 
been viewed by the Framers as so anathema to the rule of the law as to be consid-
ered tyrannical; (9) Judicial precedent or the doctrine of stare decisis recognized no 
such exclusionary rule since many legal scholars will concede that stare decisis is 
indeed a natural law principle of jurisprudence. 
 
Under the doctrine of federalism, the Framers of the Constitution held to limited 
government with specifically enumerated powers in the three major branches of 
government: Legislative, Executive and Judiciary.  Neither branch of government 
21 HADDAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 13, at 59-60 (italics mine). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966). 
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was to infringe upon the others expressly enumerated powers; to do so would be 
considered an expressed violation of the Constitution’s separation of powers doc-
trine. Therefore, constitutionally speaking, the exclusionary rule appears to be no 
more than an unconstitutional violation of this separation of powers doctrine by an 
unelected judicial oligarchy of five over the legislative branch of government.22
 
V THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ARREST STATISTICS 
Extensive study of the effects of the exclusionary rule has only been conducted in 
the last twenty years. Researchers have explored the effects of the exclusionary rule 
and the impact it has had on the prosecution of felony arrests. One researcher's 
results for individuals arrested for felonies showed that the non-prosecution or non-
conviction rate due to the exclusionary rule to be between 0.5% and 2.35%.  These 
figures were slightly higher where there was an over reliance by the prosecution on 
demonstrative, physical evidence to secure a conviction.  Therefore, the non-
prosecution or non-conviction to suspects arrested on felony drug charges was 
within the range of 2.8% to 7.1%.23  The California data that Davies' study analyses 
details that as many as 1.4% of all felons arrested were released due to improperly 
seized evidence by the police,24 0.9% of felony arrestees are released because of 
illegal searches or seizures at the preliminary hearing or after trial,25 and that 
roughly 0.5% of all felony arrestees benefit from reversals on appeal due to police 
misconduct by conducting illegal searches on their suspects.26 
 
The conclusion that many of these researchers have arrived at in their studies is that 
the exclusionary rule's impact on the judicial system in releasing felons due to 
police misconduct from illegally seized evidence has a range from statically insig-
nificant to insubstantial.  However, the small percentages of these figures obscure 
the much larger number of felons who are released on the charges against them 
22  Thomas Jefferson, America’s third president, stated in regards to the first example of judicial activism 
in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803): “To consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all 
constitutional questions, would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy.” As quoted in ALBERT J. 
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL: CONFLICT AND CONSTRUCTION 1800-1815, vol. III, 101, 
144 n. 3 (1980). Jefferson to Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820, Works: Ford, XII, 162. Yet, at the time when he was 
founding the Democratic-Republican Party, Jefferson had written to a friend that “the laws of the land, 
administered by upright judges, would protect you from any exercise of power unauthorized by the 
Constitution of the United States.” (Jefferson to Rowan, Sept. 26, 1798, id. VIII, 448.) 
23  Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of  the 
Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of  "Lost" Arrests, 1983 A.B.F. Research Journal,  
680. 
24  Id, at 650. 
25  Id, at 653. 
26  Id, at 654.  See also K. BROSI, A CROSS-CITY COMPARISON OF  FELONY CASE PROCESSING 16, 18-19 
(1979); REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPACT OF THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 10-11, 14 (1979); NARDULLI, THE 
SOCIETAL COST OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT, 1983 A.B.F. Research 
Journal 585, 600 (1983).  For notes 9-13, see also HADDAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 13, at 
564, note 2 (1987). See also Jeffrey Chudnow, Exclusionary Rule: Viability in 1997, 3-7, 
<www.fdle.state.fl.us/fcjei/ SLP%20papers/ Chudnow.PDF>.
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before their cases ever get to court due to a lack of demonstrable evidence to sustain 
a conviction against them because the incriminating evidence illegally seized by the 
police was deemed inadmissible by the exclusionary rule. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has analyzed the empirical research and the 
criticisms of the exclusionary rule, and has stated that currently, no person or or-
ganization has been able to establish with assurance whether the exclusionary rule 
has the desired deterrent effect in situations where it is applied.27 Accordingly, the 
Court has not based its opinion on purely empirical studies in formulating the 
exclusionary rule, but only on the Court’s own assumptions regarding human nature 
and the interrelationships between the various components of the law enforcement 
systems.28 It was these types of results that the Court wanted to prevent in the 
future when in Illinois v. Gates it held that: 
 
[A]ny rule of evidence that denies the jury access to clearly probative and 
reliable evidence must bear a heavy burden of justification, and must be 
carefully limited to the circumstances in which it will pay its way by deter-
ring official unlawfulness.29
 
In my analysis of Supreme Court decisions on the exclusionary rule cited in this 
Article, I found that this rule has no substantial connection or deterrent effect in the 
sorts of situations that the Court ruled in its decision. To date the exclusionary rule 
has proved ineffective in its stated premise of prohibiting police misconduct by not 
allowing illegally seized evidence to be used against a suspect.  Since in my opinion 
the exclusionary rule is of dubious constitutional origin and validity, not only is it 
therefore inimical to the rule of law, but no longer effective in its goals, the exclu-
sionary rule should be overruled as a needless impediment to police enforcement of 
the public’s expectations of the rule of law which is an expressed precept of the 
Constitution. 
 
To really have an understanding of just what kind of inane judicial legislation is 
substituted for legitimate, sound jurisprudence, one need only read what Justice 
Stewart has stated in a law review article written during a period of Supreme Court 
history when activists judges held a fairly strong majority in the cases it handed 
down especially in religious rights, criminal law, and criminal procedure cases. 
Justice Stewart states that its not the exclusionary rule, as Cardozo believed, but the 
Fourth Amendment that is to blame if the criminal goes free. Justice Stewart writes: 
 
The exclusionary rule places no limitations on the actions of the police. 
The fourth amendment does. The inevitable result of the Constitution's 
27  United States v. Janis, 428 US 433, 49 L Ed 2d 1046, 96 S Ct 3021, 76-2 USTC ¶ 16229, 38 AFTR 2d 
76-5378, on remand (CA9) 540 F2d 1022, 77-1 USTC ¶ 16252, 39 AFTR 2d 77-1239 and reh. den. 429 
US 874, 50 L. Ed. 2d 158, 97 S Ct 196, 97 S Ct 197. 
28  United States v. Janis, 428 US 433, 49 L Ed 2d 1046, 96 S Ct 3021, 76-2 USTC ¶ 16229, 38 AFTR 2d 
76-5378, on remand (CA9) 540 F2d 1022, 77-1 USTC ¶ 16252, 39 AFTR 2d 77-1239 and reh den 429 
US 874, 50 L. Ed. 2d 158, 97 S Ct 196, 97 S Ct 197. 
29  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and its require-
ments that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause is that police of-
ficers who obey its strictures will catch fewer criminals. . . . [T]hat is the 
price the framers anticipated and were willing to pay to ensure the sanctity 
of the person, home, and property against unrestrained governmental 
power.30   
 
However, one small fact that Justice Stewart leaves out in citing the Framers is that 
while they respected the Bill of Rights, they venerated natural law for without it 
they understood that no constitutional Republic could last.  It would be considered 
tyrannical and immoral to the Framers to entertain the thought of letting an obvi-
ously guilty person go free because the Court misinterpreted the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. European humanists and philosophers did not understand that the 
inseparability of law and morality was the primary reason why the French Revolu-
tion descended into anarchy and tyranny while the American Revolution, a concur-
rent movement, 228 years later stands as the oldest and strongest Republic in the 
history of mankind; emulated by budding republics and democracies around the 
world.  Furthermore, atheists, liberals and secularists have never liked the religious 
origins of the Republic, nor the harsh effects of the rule of law against the law 
breaker.   
 
In American legal history, the rule of law is deeply rooted in the Judeo-Christian 
concepts of judgment, the principle of reaping what you sow, and what Lon Fuller 
referred to as, “fidelity to law,” all of which are anathema to contemporary liberal-
ism and the academic class.31 Ideas that Judge Robert Bork referred to as “radical 
individualism” (the severe reduction of barriers to personal gratification and “radi-
cal egalitarianism” (the equality of results rather than opportunities),32 therefore 
like Justice Stewart, and many other liberal judges and law academics, they saw no 
contradiction to the rule of law by letting the criminal go free; arrogantly justifying 
it in the name of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. This is beyond the 
pale. 
 
The Court, in further defining the scope of the exclusionary rule, has so expanded 
the  rule to not only prohibit illegally seized evidence due to police misconduct, but 
all other evidence that is the "fruit" from that original evidence.  This has become 
known as the “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine.”  The rationale here is that 
generally not only must illegally obtained evidence be excluded, but also all evi-
30  Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the 
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1392-3 (1973). 
31  Lon Fuller, The Problem of Interpretation: The Case of the Penumbra, Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law–A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661-69 (1958); The Natural Law Philosophy of 
Lon L. Fuller in Contrast to Roe v. Wade and Its Progeny, Natural Law Internet Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy, available at: 
<http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/air/air_vol15no4_2000.html.> 
32 ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN 
DECLINE (back book cover) (1996) (arguing that the decline of modern culture is causally linked to the 
rise of modern liberalism). 
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dence obtained or derived from exploitation of that evidence.  The Supreme Court 
deems such evidence obtained as the “tainted fruit” of the poisonous tree.33  For 
example, in the famous case, Taylor v. Alabama, the defendant was arrested without 
probable cause and brought to the police station. The police read the defendant his 
Miranda warnings three times and permitted the defendant to speak with two 
friends.  The defendant confessed committing the crime to the police after being at 
the station for six hours when he was presented with evidence of his fingerprints at 
the crime scene.34  
 
Despite all of these mitigating presumptions to the suspect’s constitutional rights, 
the Court's majority held that the confession must be excluded because it was the 
direct result of the unlawful arrest—if defendant had not been arrested illegally, he 
would not have been in custody and would not have confessed.35  Ironically, in 
many instances, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not only prohibit 
illegally seized evidence from being presented, but it prohibits truthful evidence 
that could secure a conviction against an obviously guilty defendant from ever 
being used against him.  To emphasize this discrepancy there are a number of 
Supreme Court decisions that have tried to be bring constitutional verity and logic 
to this patently illogical, judge-made doctrine.  It is these subsequent cases that 
have grown out of the unconstitutional exclusionary rule that I consider the fruit of 
the poisonous tree.   
 
Ironically, if I were a criminal it would be to my advantage to be working during 
these times because radical liberalism in the Courts has gone to such an extreme 
degree that an obviously guilty criminal can't be arrested even after being given his 
Miranda warnings three times, talking to two friends about the crime, held for six 
hours at the police station, and voluntarily confessing to the crime to the police.  
The result—No conviction because a liberal activist majority on the Supreme Court 
that despises the rule of law and stare decisis, that favors their own personal policy 
preference, rather than following the original intent of the constitutional Framers, 
suffers the criminal to go free.  Why? Because they have the power to do so—the 
original intent of the Framers be damned! 
 
 
33  Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
34  Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982). 
35  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S Ct 3405, reh. den. 468 U.S. 1250, 82 L. 
Ed. 2d 942, 105 S. Ct 52 (recognizing good-faith exception); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 107 L. Ed. 
2d 676, 110 S. Ct. 648; Fletcher N. Baldwin, Due Process And The Exclusionary Rule: Integrity and 
Justification, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 505 (1987); M. Giulia Fabi, The Exclusionary Rule: Not the “Expressed 
Juice Of The Wooly-Headed Thistle”, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 937 (1986); Fletcher N. Bradley, Present At The 
Creation? A Critical Guide To Weeks v. United States And Its Progeny, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1031 
(1986). 
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VI EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
There are many so called exceptions to the exclusionary rule that can "break" the 
causal chain.36 For example, under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the 
exclusionary rule was very broadly applied especially during the Warren Court 
Term (1954-1968) and the Burger Court Term (1969-1986). Recently, during the 
Rehnquist Court Term (1987-2005), the Court began to further narrow the scope of 
the rule by balancing the benefit (deterrence of government misconduct) against its 
costs (exclusion of probative evidence). Now, the Court generally will not apply  
the rule when it will not likely deter government misconduct. Thus, if there is a 
weak link between the government misconduct and the evidence (i.e., it is not likely 
that the misconduct caused the evidence to be obtained), the Court will probably not 
exclude the evidence.  Although I welcome this abridgement of the exclusionary 
rule, by the Rehnquist court that has brought a degree of rationality to an ungainly, 
irredeemable Court rule, in order to maintain sound constitutional jurisprudence, the 
legislature and/or the Supreme Court must overrule the exclusionary rule, Miranda, 
and all of the cases that followed its judicial precedents. Despite a chipping away at 
the exclusionary rule, to date the Rehnquist Court hasn’t had the judicial will to 
overrule the case law that has created this intractable monstrosity called the exclu-
sionary rule. 
 
Exceptions to the exclusionary rule are many and complex. The following are the 
most frequently used exceptions by the Court to the exclusionary rule. (1) The 
Independent Source Rule.  Evidence is admissible if the prosecution can show that 
it was obtained from a source independent of the original illegality; (2) The Inter-
vening Act of Free Will Rule.  An intervening act of free will by the original illegal-
ity and thus remove the taint. This narrowing of the exclusionary rule was achieved 
by the Court in the Wong Sun v. United States case; (3) The Inevitable Discovery 
Rule.  If the prosecution can show that the police would have discovered the evi-
dence it will be admissible;37 (4) The In-court Identification Rule. The defendant 
may not exclude the witness's in-court identification on the ground that it is the fruit 
of an unlawful detention; (5) The Automobile Exception. Regarding this latter rule, 
Professor Marvin Zalman wrote the following prescient remarks: 
 
The automobile, or vehicle, exception, has produced a large body of case law and a 
good deal of confusion. In Carroll v. United States (1925),38 the Court upheld a 
warrantless search of an automobile traveling on the highway and the tearing up of 
its leather back seat, when the police had probable cause to believe it was transport-
ing “bootleg” liquor. Obtaining a warrant would have been fruitless as the vehicle 
would quickly be beyond the officers’ reach and the contraband gone: California v. 
Carney (1985) added another rationale to the automobile warrantless search excep-
tion—the lesser expectation of privacy in vehicles due in part to their nature and in 
36  Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
37  United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980). 
38 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (Court upheld a warrantless search of an automobile 
traveling on the highway). See also ZALMAN & SIEGEL, KEY CASES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra 
note 14, at 226. 
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part to their high degree of regulation. In that case the fact that respondent lived in a 
mobile van capable of being driven away did not confer the protection of a home; a 
warrantless search was upheld. 39
 
The exclusionary rule is also limited in two major areas, it is inapplicable to grand 
juries and in civil proceedings.  For example, a grand jury witness may not refuse to 
answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an 
unlawful search and seizure, unless the evidence was obtained in violation of the 
federal wiretapping statute.40
 
VII TO WARRANT OR NOT TO WARRANT?                                           
THAT IS THE QUESTION 
Constitutional law for the past 35 years has required the police to have probable 
cause before they can lawfully arrest a suspect. If the police goes to a suspect's 
home and improperly arrests him without a warrant, this is considered a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule is activated, and all evidence seized 
subsequent to the arrest will not be admissible. On this point, in a 1980 case, Payton 
v. New York, the Court held:  
 
. . [T]hat the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made 
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, … prohibits the po-
lice from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s 
home in order to make a routine felony arrest.41  
 
However, the original intent of the Fourth Amendment says nothing about the 
police necessarily required to have a warrant to secure entrance to a home the 
police suspect’s criminal activity is occurring, but when you do get a warrant, here 
are the constitutional criteria.42 Furthermore, if the suspect confesses at home, and 
the police then take him to the station, the suspect confesses again at the police 
station, the home confession must be excluded from evidence since it is the fruit of 
the illegal arrest, but the station house confession is admissible because it is not a 
fruit of the unlawful arrest. Because the police had probable cause to arrest the 
suspect, they did not gain anything from the unlawful arrest—they could  have 
39  California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (Court held that law enforcement agents not violate the 
Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless search, based on probable cause, of a fully 
mobile “motor home” located in a public place). 
40  United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); 
Congressional intent sought to codify all existing search and seizure laws. See Senate Report No. 1097, 
accompanying P. L. 90-351; 29 Am Jur 2d § 610. 
41  Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
42  Fourth Amendment:   
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.  
BILL OF RIGHTS, FOURTH AMENDMENT (1790). 
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lawfully arrested suspect the moment he stepped outside of  his home and then 
brought him to the station for his confession.43  Thus, this police misconduct was 
not a fruit of the poisonous tree due to the fact that suspect was arrested at home as 
opposed to somewhere else.44 This case is a good example of if you ask the wrong 
question, you will get the wrong answer. Although I agree with the conclusion in 
this example, the silly and convoluted logic the Court uses to reach its decision 
makes a mockery of  the  Constitution and of prior Supreme Court precedent cases 
by applying the Bill of Rights to the Constitution in a manner that would have been 
scarcely coherent to the Framers.  
 
For example, if the police illegally search a warehouse and discover marijuana, but 
doesn’t seize it, then the police later return to the warehouse with a valid warrant 
based on information totally unrelated to the illegal search.  If police seize the 
marijuana pursuant to the warrant, the marijuana is admissible.45 There is also the 
exception of the Intervening Act of Free Will.  An intervening act of free will 
remove the taint. For example, the suspect was released on his own recognizance 
after an illegal arrest, but later returned to the station to confess. This voluntary act 
of free will removed any taint from the confession. 
 
Another exception to the exclusionary rule is the Inevitable Discovery exception. 
This rule applies in the case of live witness testimony. An exception to the rule can 
be made if it is difficult for a suspect to have live witness testimony excluded as the 
fruit of illegal police conduct, or a more direct link between the unconstitutional 
police conduct and the testimony is required than for exclusion of other evidence. 
The factors a court must consider in determining whether a sufficiently direct link 
exists include the extent to which the witness is freely willing to testify and the 
extent to which excluding the witness's testimony would prevent future illegal 
conduct. This was the judicial reasoning used in the Boyd case as far back as 1886 
by closely limiting its opinion to the facts, rather than to go down the slippery slope 
of crafting a multitude of bizarre scenarios and exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 
Thus an exclusionary rule based on Fourth Amendment violations was rejected by 
the Court a few years later the Court in Adams v. New York (1904) followed the 
common law rule that evidence was admissible however acquired.46
 
A conviction will not necessarily be overturned merely because improperly ob-
tained evidence was admitted at trial; the harmless error test applies, so a conviction 
can be upheld if the conviction would have resulted despite the improper evidence. 
For example, the Court in Chapman v. California (1967)47 and Milton v. Wain-
43  New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
44  Murray  v. United States, 419 U.S. 942  (1998). 
45  Wong Sun v. U.S.  371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
46 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Since this case arose from a state court and concerned a 
search by state officers, it could have been decided simply by holding that the Fourth Amendment was 
inapplicable. See National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 71 (1914) as quoted in: Enforcing the 
Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule, <caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendment>, 2, 
n. 169. 
47  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 282 (1967). 
789   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 10 NO 2 
 
                                                          
wright (1972),48 held that the government bears the burden of showing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the admission of the improperly obtained evidence was 
“harmless.”  Finally, in enforcing the exclusionary rule, the defendant has a right to 
hearing on motion to suppress.  In Jackson v. Denno (1964) the Court held that the 
defendant was entitled to have the admissibility of evidence of a confession decided 
as a matter of law by a judge out of the hearing of the jury.49  The Court in Lego v. 
Twomey (1972) held that it is permissible to let the jury reconsider the "admissibil-
ity" of the evidence if the judge finds it admissible, but there is no constitutional 
right to such a dual evaluation.50 In the decision of LaValee v. Delle Rose (1973), 
the Court held that the defendant is not constitutionally entitled to have a specific 
finding of fact on each factual question.  As in   Lego v. Twomey, the Court held in 
Simmons v. U.S. (1968) that the government bears the burden of establishing admis-
sibility by a preponderance of the evidence.  The defendant has the right to testify at 
the suppression hearing without his testimony being admitted against him at trial on 
the issue of guilt.51
 
In U.S. v. Janis, the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not forbid one sover-
eign from using in civil proceedings evidence that was illegally seized by the agent 
of another sovereign.52  Moreover, the Supreme Court would probably allow the 
sovereign that has seized the illegally obtained evidence to use it in a civil proceed-
ing.  The exclusionary rule does apply, however, to a proceeding for forfeiture of an 
article used in violation of the criminal law, when forfeiture is clearly a penalty for 
the criminal offense.  For example, evidence that is inadmissible in a state criminal 
trial because it was illegally seized by the police may be used by the I.R.S.  The rule 
is inapplicable to internal agency rules. In United States v. Caceres, the Court held 
that the exclusionary rule applies only if there is a violation of the Constitution or 
federal law; it does not apply to a violation of only internal agency rules.53  The 
exclusionary rule does not apply when the police act in good faith based on case 
law later changed by another judicial opinion,54 or on a facially valid statute or 
ordinance as it then exists, even if the law is declared unconstitutional, is changed 
by a subsequent court decision, or when the police act in reliance in good faith on a 
defective search warrant.55  The rationale is this: one of the main purposes of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter improper police conduct, and this purpose cannot be 
served where police are acting in good faith.56
 
48  Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972). 
49  Jackson v. Denno, 378, U.S. 368 (1964). 
50  Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972). 
51  Simmons v. U.S.,  390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
52  United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). 
53   United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). 
54  United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).  
55 Michigan v. deFillippo, 433 U.S. 31 (1976); United States v. Leon, 486 U.S. 897 (1984); Massachu-
setts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 891, 82 L Ed 2d 737, 104 S Ct 3424, on remand 394 Mass 381, 476 NE2d 
541 (1984).  
56  United States v. Savoca, (CA6 Ohio) 761 F2d 292, cert. den. 474 US 852, 88 L Ed 2d 126, 106 S Ct 
153; United States v. Leary, (CA10 Colo) 846 F2d 592. 
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The Court in U. S. v. Leon and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, suggested four excep-
tions to the good faith defense for reliance on a defective search warrant.  A police 
officer cannot rely on a defective search warrant in good faith if:  (1) The affidavit 
underlying the warrant is so lacking in probable cause that no reasonable police 
officer would have relied on it; (2) The warrant is defective on its face (it fails to 
state with particularity the place to be searched or the things to be seized);  (3) The 
police officer or government official obtaining the warrant lied to, or misled, the 
magistrate;  (4) The magistrate has "wholly abandoned his judicial role."   
 
Concerning point number one, as I have stated repeatedly in this article, it is an 
absurd and unconstitutional procedural requirement for the Court to require the 
police to get a warrant in the first place. The warrant requirement is another exam-
ple of Court’s overreaching into the domain of the lawmaking branch of govern-
ment by legislating from the bench instead of interpreting the Constitution.  Are 
judges more adept than the police at catching criminals?  It is ridiculous to require 
the police to come to a judge to get a warrant  in order to enter a home where sus-
pected criminal activity is in process despite the Court trying to nullify this paradox 
with a myriad of exceptions to the exclusionary rule.  I am sure that there have been 
multitudes of criminals that have escaped the law because of the delay required to 
secure a warrant.  In order for police to capture certain criminals, timing is every-
thing. On the second point I ask: Are the police clairvoyant?  A lot of times the 
police don't exactly know what type of criminal activity is going on at a residence, 
but they have a strong "hunch" or have been tipped off by a second-hand source, 
usually some anonymous citizen in the neighborhood, that a crime is being perpe-
trated at a certain place.  On point number three, as I mentioned earlier, the original 
intent of the Constitution required no warrant in order for the police to enter a home 
suspected of criminal activity. 
 
The Court decisions that support the warrant requirements are examples of judicial 
legislation from the bench.  This type of case law is unconstitutionally illegitimate 
and all such cases should be promptly overruled by the Court as soon as the oppor-
tunity arises.  Fourthly, the Court's critical language in Leon (“the majority has 
totally abandoned his judicial role”) can be interpreted to mean the judge didn't 
follow the unconstitutional rulings regarding the issuing of warrants, the exclusion-
ary rule, therefore we will not give credence to the warrant issued nor the evidence 
based on the warrant to be used against the defendant.  More than likely, the defen-
dant will either go free or have the charges against him substantially reduced to the 
detriment of the prosecutor's case and to the denigration of the rule of law. 
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The Court will allow the use of excluded evidence for impeachment purposes for 
certain evidentiary purposes.  Some illegally obtained evidence that is inadmissible 
in the state's case in chief may nevertheless be used to impeach the defendant's 
credibility if he takes the stand at trial.  For example, an otherwise voluntary con-
fession taken in violation of the Miranda requirements is admissible at trial for 
impeachment purposes.  However, a truly involuntary confession is not admissible 
for any purpose.60 Secondly, regarding the fruit of illegal searches, the prosecution 
may use evidence obtained from an illegal search that is inadmissible in its direct 
case to impeach the defendant's statements made in response to proper cross-
examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination, but such 
illegally obtained evidence cannot be used to impeach the trial testimony of wit-
nesses other than the defendant. 
 
 
VIII CONCLUSION 
 What should be done regarding the exclusionary rule?  The Supreme Court, as 
soon as an appropriate case is brought before them, should unanimously overrule 
Weeks v. United States and put an end to the absurd and unconstitutional exclusion-
ary rule and all of the poisonous fruit cases that grew out of it (Wolf, Miranda, 
Mapp, Taylor, et al.).57  The exclusionary rule has been the controlling legal author-
ity for illegal searches and seizures for the past century. It has only put an unrea-
sonable and unconstitutional burden upon the police to follow the exact letter of a 
judge-made law when performing their duties at peril of obtaining no conviction.  
Obviously the police should obey the law, but is it within the Supreme Court's 
expressly enumerated constitutional powers for them to write a police code of 
conduct?  I think not. This is essentially what they have done by this judge-made 
invention of the exclusionary rule.  As Justice Cardozo argued, certainly there is no 
justice or respect for the rule of law to allow an obviously guilty person to go free, 
“because the constable (i.e., police, prosecutor, judge) has blundered.” 
 
Furthermore, in a post-9/11 world where technology and radical ideology has taken 
crime to an international level, authorities are grappling with notions of suspending 
constitutional doctrines has “habeas corpus” if “enemy combatants” are captured 
during time of  “war”. On this point a student wrote in a Comment the following 
prescient remarks: 
 
Probably in light of this historical evidence, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right and that 
“the governments’ use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution. . . . In practice, a sus-
pension of habeas corpus will result in a suspension of any rights of due 
process. . . . In sum, the historical evidence can undoubtedly be read to 
57  United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). 
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support a restriction of Fourth Amendment rights during wartime, or grave 
threats to public safety, and a fortiori a restriction on the Fourth Amend-
ment remedy of the exclusionary rule. . . . While the Court may not wish to 
do away with all search and seizure protection for aliens, limiting the ex-
clusionary rule to citizens would certainly bring the scope of those rights 
closer to the intent of the framers. . . . Even assuming the Court would find 
that aliens possess Fourth Amendment rights, which does not necessarily 
mean the exclusionary rule must be applied.58
58 Recently there has been much discussion in the news about several states overturning the Miranda 
warning requirement when the police initiate the arrest of a suspect.  The case in question is a Virginia 
case, U.S. vs. Dickerson, 528 U.S. 1045 (1999).  This anti-Miranda movement originated from the legal 
research of a University of Utah law professor  and  his  re-discovery of Title 18 Section 3501 which was 
the original federal statute upon which the Miranda case was based. Admissibility of Confessions: 
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a 
confession, as defined in subsection (3) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is volun-
tarily given.  Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the 
presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that 
the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall 
permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the 
jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circum-
stances. 
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all 
the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing 
between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, it was made after ar-
rest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with 
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) 
whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any 
statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such de-
fendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) 
whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and 
when giving such confession.  The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors 
to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntari-
ness of the confession. 
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the district of Columbia, a confes-
sion made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person was under ar-
rest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement 
agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a 
magistrate or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the 
laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is found by the 
trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left to 
the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immedi-
ately following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in 
this subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before 
such magistrate or other officer beyond such six hour period is found by the trial judge to be 
reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the near-
est available such magistrate or other officer.  
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in evidence of any confession 
made or given voluntarily by any person to any other person without interrogation by anyone, 
or at any time at which the person who made or gave such confession was not under arrest or 
other detention. 
(e) As used in this section, the term “confession” means any confession of guilt of any crimi-
nal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing. 
(Added Pub. L. 90-351, title II, sec 701(a), June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 210, and amended Publ. L. 90-578, 
title III, sec 301(a)(3), Oct. 17, 1968, 82 Stat. 1115.) United States Code, 1988 Ed. U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1989, pp. 500-01. 
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Bluntly speaking, the exclusionary rule is insane jurisprudence as well as a patent 
example of liberal judicial activism of the most outrageous kind.  What the Courts 
and the police departments should do when confronted by improper police conduct 
is not to let the guilty go free, which makes a mockery of justice and endangers the 
public, but as a separate issue, duly punish, reprimand, or fine the errant police 
officer(s).59    
 
There are also many other avenues that a person can seek redress  or obtain a rem-
edy for deprivation of their constitutional rights due to improper police conduct 
including civil suits, injunctions, formal complaints, etc.60  Although I strongly 
desire that the Rehnquist Court have the judicial fortitude to overrule the exclusion-
ary rule61 as soon as the proper case is brought before them seeing that many Jus-
tices over the past 25 years have expressed skepticism over the constitutional 
validity of the exclusionary rule.62  To continue to follow the tortured judicial logic 
 
59 Matt J. O’Laughlin, Comment: Exigent Circumstances: Circumscribing the Exclusionary Rule In 
Response to 9/11, 70 UMKC. L. REV. 707, 707 (2002).  
60 In modern times, a person who has been arrested illegally will usually have an opportunity to file a tort 
action against the offending officer. See Harvey A. Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal 
for Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123 (1967).  
61  E.g., Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Chief Justice Burger: rule ought to be discarded now, 
rather than wait for a replacement as he argued earlier); id. at 536 (Justice White: modify rule to admit 
evidence seized illegally, but in good faith); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 412 U.S. 218, 261 (1973) 
(Justice Powell); Brown v. Illinois 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Justice Powell); Robbins v. California 453 
U.S. 420, 437 (1981) (Justice Rehnquist); California v. Minjares 443 U.S. 916 (1979) (Justice Rehnquist 
joined by Chief Justice Burger); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 510 (1971) (Justice Black-
mun joining Justice Black's dissent that ''the Fourth Amendment supports no exclusionary rule''). 
62  Professor Zalman wrote the following prescient analysis in the abstract of his article on Chaves v. 
Martinez regarding the Courts latest attempts to mend, not end the exclusionary rule: 
On December 4, 2002 the United States  Supreme Court heard oral argument in Chavez v. 
Martinez on the issue of whether police officers have qualified immunity against liability in a 
civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a violation of Fifth or Fourteenth amend-
ment rights arising from the interrogation of a suspect. . . assumes that the Court will decide 
that even an abusive interrogation in itself violates no right guaranteed by the privilege 
against self-incrimination or by the due process voluntariness test.  The Court will declare 
that the Fifth Amendment privilege and the Fourteenth Amendment voluntariness test are trial 
rights that come into play as exclusionary rules in criminal cases. The implication of this pre-
dicted ruling will be profound. It will relegate suits for abusive interrogation and torture to 
state actions or to the high threshold of the substantive due process “shocks the conscience” 
doctrine. More importantly, it will make it clear that despite a good deal of judicial rhetoric to 
the contrary, Miranda does not create rules that police must obey. This could open the door to 
a highly suspect practice of interrogation “outside Miranda” in some cases, although such a 
ruling will call into question cases that allow the introduction of Miranda- violated statements 
for purposes of impeachment and evidence derived from Miranda-violated statements.  
Marvin Zalman, The Coming Paradigm Shift on Miranda: The Impact of Chavez v. Martinez, 39(3) 
CRIM. L. BULLETIN 334 (2003); Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F. 3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 
122 S. Ct. 2326, 153 L. Ed. 2d 158, 535 U.S. 1111 (2003).  
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority in Chavez held: 
In deciding whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, we must first determine 
whether the officer’s alleged conduct violated a constitutional right. See Katz, 533 U.S., at 
201. If not, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity, and we need not consider whether the 
asserted right was “clearly established.” Id. We conclude that Martinez’s allegations fail to 
state a violation of his constitutional rights. 
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of the exclusionary rule is to continue to make a mockery of the Constitution, the 
Bill of Rights and the rule of law. 
 
For the Court to “legislate from the bench” follow this extreme from of radical 
leftist jurisprudence based on philosophical notions of radical egalitarianism, radi-
cal individualism, and placing judges personal policy preferences over the plain text 
of the Constitution, is to give our most dangerous and wanton criminals a key to 
their own jail cells to the peril of public safety and the erosion of the public's confi-
dence in a civil society governed by the rule of law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During one of our many discussions of the exclusionary rule, attorney Che Karega had the idea of the 
Court allowing states and local municipalities tie illegal search and seizures as a detriment to police 
promotions.  
